TWO COUNTRY OLG MODEL ON THE GLOBAL TRANSMISSION OF FISCAL POLICY: Time Preference, Government Debt and Tax Reform in an Open Economy

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This research aims to answer several issues on the global transmission effects of the government fiscal policy. How does the difference in time preferences of individuals affect economic variables in an open economy? How is the government debt or budget deficit of a country transmitted to other countries? Which tax scheme is the best for capital accumulation and welfare of countries? Wage income tax? Capital income tax? Consumption tax? In order to address the issues, this research builds a two- country overlapping-generations (OLG) model in which there exist different time preferences, different fiscal policies, and different tax schemes between countries. In particular, the model adopt a utility function with a constant inter-temporal elasticity of substitution, in which saving positively depends on both labor income and the interest rate.

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The Origins of American Public Finance: Debates over Money, Debt, and Taxes in the Constitutional Era, 1776-1836 (Contributions in Economics and Economic History)

The Origins of American Public Finance: Debates over Money, Debt, and Taxes in the Constitutional Era, 1776-1836 (Contributions in Economics and Economic History) Review

The Origins of American Public Finance: Debates over Money, Debt, and Taxes in the Constitutional Era, 1776-1836 (Contributions in Economics and Economic History) Overview

An examination of an early version of the debate over money, debt, and taxes sheds light on current debates regarding public finance, a balanced budget, and paying off the public debt. Stabile shows that while special interest lobbying during the constitutional convention produced tax loopholes as part of the Constitution, determined leaders were able to get a reluctant population used to paying taxes and were capable of putting together plans of public finance that attained their goals. Such historical evidence challenges the view that political leaders are incapable of passing the unpopular taxes needed to balance the federal government's budget and pay off the public debt.

Taking a political economy approach that describes how political leaders took economic ideas and made them work, this book combines intellectual history with economic history. Previous books on public finance history have focused on economic issues regarding taxes. Exploring the intellectual history of the debates over money, debt, and taxes as the three potential forms of public finance, Stabile provides insight into the constitutional debate alive at the end of the 20th century.

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